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11 September 2001 and its aftermath have changed the dynamics of terrorism and domestic 
insurgency in South Asia. Of particular significance have been India's efforts to isolate Pakistan 
for its ambiguous stance on terrorism—fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda as terrorists while 
casting Kashmiri militants as freedom fighters. In this tense environment, the 13 December 
terrorist attack on the Indian parliament brought the sub-continent to the brink of war. Pressure 
from the international community and the dangers of war apparently led Pakistan's President 
Pervez Musharraf to pledge that Pakistan's territory would not be a base for terrorism against any 
country or region, including Kashmir. As a prelude to de-escalating war readiness, the Indian 
government sought indications of a reduction in cross-border infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir 
(J&K) from Pakistan. The international community saw the J&K assembly elections in September-
October 2002 as an opportunity to judge the Pakistani claim of an ongoing freedom struggle in 
Kashmir and the Indian claim of Pakistan-abetted terrorism in the region. This essay analyzes the 
election outcome and its contribution to the current uncertainty in India-Pakistan relations. 
The Elections 
During the run-up to the Jammu and Kashmir elections, commentary in the Indian media 
suggested that the international community wanted peaceful elections in Kashmir as a 
prerequisite for reconciliation in South Asia. Foreign leaders visiting South Asia during this period 
asked India to ensure free and fair elections, and they asked Pakistan not to interfere in this 
process. The Indian government reportedly provided adequate security to voters and also free 
access to media and the diplomatic community to monitor these elections.[1] However, even 
before the elections got underway the Pakistan government declared them a farce, an Indian 
attempt to legitimize their occupation of Kashmir.[2] And Pakistan made no apparent attempt to 
curb the anti-elections militant activities originating from its soil.  
Large-scale violence preceded the J&K elections, killing 84 political workers including three 
candidates. The Indian government claimed an increase in cross-border infiltration and coercion 
of voters by the Pakistan-based militant outfits. Despite widespread violence and coercion, and 
an election boycott by pro-Pakistan and pro-independence political parities, the state experienced 
an average polling turnout of 44 percent, which is marginally less than the previous two elections 
held in 1996 and 1998 respectively.  
Analysis of voting patterns suggested substantial regional variations in turnout, with the Jammu 
region at 57-60 percent, Kargil and Leh at more than 70 percent, the Udhampur region at 61-63 
percent, and Poonch-Rajauri at 48-52 percent, while the Kashmir valley had only 28 percent 
turnout. Within the valley the worst turnout was in the capital, Srinagar (11 percent), which was 
attributable to militants' threats and a call for an election boycott by the Hurriyat Conference. In 
certain areas in the valley, where rebels among the radical organizations stood as candidates, the 
voting percentage was high. The hilly regions of the valley such as Uri, Gulmarag and Gurez, 
showed a high turnout due to the predominance of a tribal Muslim (Gujjars) population in these 
areas. In certain regions voters alleged that security forces coerced them to vote. However, 
international and domestic media covering the J&K elections did not find substance in such 
allegations. Rather, it was suggested that some voters made these allegations due to fear of 
post-election reprisals by militants.[3]  
 
The domestic and international response to the Jammu and Kashmir elections was mixed. 
Pakistan claimed the elections to be a sham.[4] U.S. and the British representatives expressed 
satisfaction with the elections and expressed optimism that they could lead to regional peace.[5] 
Post-Election Jammu and Kashmir and the Prospects for Peace 
The most significant political outcome of these elections was the people's verdict against the 
ruling National Conference, which was voted out of power (see table). After nearly a month's 
political haggling, the new J&K government was formed by a coalition of the Indian National 
Congress Party and the People's Democratic Party (PDP). 
Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly Election Results 
National Conference 28 
Indian National Congress 20 
People's Democratic Party 16 
Bharatiya Janata Party 1 
Communist Party of India 2 
Others 20 
TOTAL SEATS 87 
Source: Election commission of India declarations, October 2002 
The election boycott call by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) affected only some parts 
of Kashmir Valley. In the remaining J&K—and especially the hilly areas of the valley, Ladakh, 
Rajauri-Poonch, Jammu, and Udhampur—people had largely ignored its call. The APHC thus lost 
a historic opportunity to play a pivotal role in Kashmir politics. Also, the large turnout despite 
APHC's boycott call belied their claim to be the true representatives of the Kashmiri people. The 
ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) managed to secure the support of the domestic militant 
organization Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), which in turn resulted in local militants entering the 
political fray at the cost of Pakistan-based HuM leaders, and their APHC ideologues.[6] 
In the wake of the elections, whether peace will prevail in Jammu and Kashmir will depend on 
four factors: one, the ability of the new J&K government to deliver on its promises; two, Pakistan's 
attitude on cross-border terrorism into Kashmir; three, the sincerity of Indian efforts to tackle the 
J&K issue; and four, resolute efforts for peace by the people of Kashmir, to follow up on the 
fighting spirit they recently exhibited by coming out to vote despite terrorist threats. 
The PDP's Mufti Mohammed Sayeed is currently heading the new state government in J&K. 
Sayeed was India's Home Minister during 1990-91, when the current phase of militancy had 
started in the state. Mr. Sayeed is known for soft handling of militants, as evident from his 
mishandling of the December 1989 abduction of his daughter,[7] which indicated that he lacked 
the will and understanding to define and implement a resolute policy against terrorist violence. His 
recent statements and also his party's election manifesto suggest that there has been no 
evolution of a counter-terrorism perspective within his political thinking. Mr. Sayeed's recent 
actions such as keeping J&K out of the purview of the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 
the release of 200 militants from custody, and the disbanding of the Special Operations Group 
(SOG), has sent mixed signals to the state's security apparatus.[8] It is widely acknowledged that 
the state needs political, economic, and security initiatives to quell the current insurgency. 
However, political initiatives without a coherent anti-terrorism policy in J&K are likely to prove 
counter-productive since the violence is largely driven from outside the state. Still, during the last 
two months there has been a perceptible decline in militant activities in J&K. It is premature to 
judge whether this decline is due to the J&K government's efforts or to a shift in Pakistan's 
Kashmir policy. 
In October 2002, India decided to redeploy its military from the international border, thereby 
signaling a desire to end the 10 month old military impasse with Pakistan. Pakistan followed suit 
and called for negotiations with India. The Indian government has made talks with Pakistan 
conditional on an end to cross-border infiltration from Pakistan into Kashmir, and also some other 
parts of India. Pakistan persists with a Kashmir policy based upon self-determination (by 
plebiscite) for the Kashmiri people (as per UN Security Council resolutions of 1948), and its 
theme of providing only moral and political support to an indigenous freedom movement in 
Kashmir. Pakistani leaders have also portrayed the Indian decision to de-escalate their military 
posture as a victory for Pakistan[9], thereby indicating that they feel no pressing need for 
acceding to India's and the international community's demand to end cross-border infiltration. In a 
related development Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a pro-Taliban, pro-al Qaeda radical 
alliance, currently rules Pakistan's North Western Frontier Province (NWFP)—which adjoins 
those areas of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan. The Pakistan-based militant organizations located 
in the NWFP now have political patronization.[10] Even if Pakistan's federal government intends 
to curb militant activities, they will find it all the more difficult to do so.  
Successive Indian governments have had Kashmir on their political agenda, and rarely has the 
issue become a subject of national concern. Political leaders over the years have tried to tackle 
the Kashmir issue from different perspectives: Prime Minister Nehru tried the multilateral 
approach and took the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council; Prime Minister Shashtri tried 
the Tashkent experiment; Mrs. Gandhi attempted the bilateral approach that led to Simla 
Agreement; Mr. I.K. Gujral tried to solve the issue within the ambit of his Gujral doctrine; and 
current Prime Minister Vajpayee has tried the realistic approach that led to Lahore process, and 
then to Agra. Notwithstanding the sincerity of Indian leaders in following these different 
approaches, they lacked a national consensus because they were seen by political rivals in 
narrow and partisan political perspectives. Recently, however, there is growing realization among 
all sections of Indian society that the Kashmir problem has caused India to suffer economically 
and politically, and hence there is an urgent need to forge a national consensus on Kashmir.  
In linking talks with Pakistan to the cross-border infiltration issue, the Indian government has two 
possible motives: one, it is hoped that internationally, Pakistan will be seen as continually 
violating its own commitments on terrorism; and two, domestically, the current Indian leadership 
hopes to reap political benefits from taking a resolute stand against Pakistan. This policy of 
conditional talks with Pakistan does not define a threshold of tolerance for cross-border 
infiltration. Due to the social, economic, and political connotations of cross-border movement, 
complete cessation of such activity is unlikely. Hence, making it a precondition of any dialogue 
with Pakistan is unrealistic. 
Whether caused by militants or by the Indian security forces, the people who suffer from violence 
in the region are the Kashmiris. Their participation in large numbers in last fall's elections 
indicates their yearning for peace. This new political resurgence in Kashmir has opened up 
avenues for people to address enduring problems such as unemployment, education, and health 
care. The new J&K government has the mandate of the people to deliver peace—which is 
possible if all segments of the Kashmiri population, including the APHC, work together for the 
common good of all Kashmiris. 
The Kashmir Elections and the War on Terrorism 
Through the recent Kashmir elections, the international community has had an opportunity to 
assess the internal dynamics of Kashmir politics. It also enabled visiting delegates to draw their 
own conclusions about the security situation in the region. The U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi, 
Robert Blackwill, said on 29 October 2002 that terrorism in Kashmir is "externally driven." He 
again stated on January 2003 that the U.S. war on terrorism would include the ongoing terrorism 
in Kashmir. These are very significant developments, and indicate that in the wake of last fall's 
elections the U.S. government realizes the role of externally driven terrorist forces in Kashmir.  
Indian officials have often complained that the United States has been unwilling to forcibly 
pressure Islamabad to curb militancy in Kashmir.[11] This is partially true, although U.S. officials 
note that President Musharraf has been privately encouraged to abandon his support for Kashmir 
militants. The U.S. strategy in the region appears to be following a two-tier tract: relentless 
operations against renegade Taliban and al Qaeda, and managing anti-U.S. dissent inside 
Pakistan by supporting the Musharraf regime.[12] According to some experts, the key 
consideration underlying U.S. policy is the belief that Kashmir is simply not an issue that 
Musharraf can move decisively on. Pushing Musharraf too forcibly on Kashmir risks fatally 
undermining a key ally in the war against terrorism and possibly setting off a chain of events that 
lead to the institution of a more divided Pakistan.[13] However, there are risks to this strategy. 
First, being too soft on Pakistan when it comes to Kashmir risks undercutting U.S. relations with 
India. Second, there is risk that Pakistan, if given too much leeway, may become a haven for a 
resurgent al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is reportedly active within Pakistan with support from Pakistan-
based radical organizations having linkages with Kashmiri militants.[14] An attack by Pakistan-
based al Qaeda elements would undermine U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, and would 
have adverse political repercussions for a U.S. administration already accused by some of failing 
to duly heed intelligence warnings about al Qaeda threats prior to 9/11.  
Therefore, it is essential that the United States reconsider its policy towards Pakistan lest it risk 
the emergence of a terrorist operational environment in Pakistan, as previously happened in 
Afghanistan. A suggested policy framework would include aggressive U.S. support for democratic 
institutions in Pakistan, and pressuring the Pakistani army to accommodate Indian concerns 
about cross-border terrorism into Jammu and Kashmir. 
 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
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